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Abstract—Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2014 is 
showing a horrified fact, that when an attacker looked for a site 
to compromise, one in eight sites made it relatively easy to gain 
access. Many attackers are arrested due to the evidences obtained 
by computer forensics. The victim machine usually gives some 
data, which are then used for identifying possible suspects, which 
is followed by forensic analysis of their devices, like computers, 
laptops, tablets, and even smart phones. In this paper, we use an 
attack scenario on the known vulnerable web application 
WackoPicko, of three types of attacks: SQL Injection, stored 
XSS, and remote file inclusion, usually performed by using a web 
browser. We use post-mortem computer forensic analysis of 
attacker and victim machine to find some artifacts in them, 
which can help to identify and possible to reconstruct the attack, 
and most important to obtain valid evidence which holds in 
court. We assume that the attacker was careless and did not 
perform any anti-forensic techniques on its machine.  
Keywords-Computer Forensics; SQL Injection; File Inclusion; 
XSS. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Vulnerability scans of public websites carried out in 2013 
by Symantec’s Website Vulnerability Assessment Services 
found that 77 percent of sites contained vulnerabilities, and 16 
percent of them were classified as critical vulnerabilities that 
could allow attackers to access sensitive data, alter the 
website’s content, or compromise visitors’ computers (Internet 
Security Threat Report 2014, [1]). The OWASP (Open Web 
Application Security Project) Top Ten 2013 [2] offers a list of 
the most critical Web application vulnerabilities, including 
different types of injection, broken authentication and session 
management, cross-site scripting, secure misconfiguration, etc. 
Many organizations lose their reputation or revenue, because of 
various hackers’ attacks. Today, the cybercrime is a global 
problem, and the computer forensics is one way to combat it. 
Computer forensics prepares legal evidences and give answers 
to many questions of legal systems related to computers. 
Analyzed forensic images are the primary evidence.  
We chose to investigate three types of attacks, SQL 
injection, stored XSS and remote file injection, which are 
usually conducted through a web browser. We are interested in 
what kind of post-mortem forensic artifacts can be found after 
performing attack on the attacker and victim machine. As a 
tested web application, we use known vulnerable WackoPicko 
[3], first introduced by Doupe et al. [4]. Also, we assume that 
the attacker did not perform any anti-forensic techniques 
(format, wipe etc.) on its machine. We are aware that 
conducted research is very platform specific, so our results 
holds for the dominant Apache web server and Backtrack 5 R3 
attacker’s machine. But similar artifacts can be also expected 
on other related attacker/victim platforms, too. 
We showed that from the three types of attacks, remote file 
inclusion and use of shells leave many traces on both 
machines, most of them in log files on the victim and web 
history in the attacker.  
After Introduction Section, Section II is devoted to 
attacking scenario, including a short description of vulnerable 
web application WackoPicko, and detailed description of three 
performed attacks SQL injection, stored XSS and remote file 
inclusion. In Section III we give a brief overview of performed 
forensic analysis of both machines, followed by discussion of 
the results and final conclusions.  
A. Previous work 
To our knowledge, there are no many papers for forensic 
investigation of web attacks. Andrade and Gan [5] investigate 
passive attacks for determination of vulnerabilities of Linux 
Ubuntu server, using Linux BackTrack 5 tools, including 
Metasploit, Nessus, Whatweb, Nmap, PHP-Backdoor and 
Weevely. They use netstat tool and server log files for forensic 
investigation of the attacks. Good forensics analysis of Linux 
RAM is given in [6]. Shulman and Waidner [7] show how 
digital signatures from DNSSEC can be useful in forensic 
analysis. 
II. ATTACK SCENARIO
For the attack, we use virtual WM Ware machine with 
installed BackTrack 5 R3 and with IP address 192.168.60.159.  
A. Vulnerable web application 
The vulnerable WackoPicko application is a photo sharing 
and photo-purchasing site. Users of WackoPicko can upload 
photos, browse other user’s photos, comment on photos, and 
purchase the rights to a high-quality version of a photo. It has 
10 vulnerabilities accessible without authentication (reflected 
and stored XSS, reflected XSS behind JavaScript, predictable 
Session ID for admin, weak admin password, reflected SQLI, 
command line injection, file inclusion, unauthorized file 
exposure, and parameter manipulation), and 6 vulnerabilities 
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accessible after logging into the web site (multi-step stored 
XSS, stored SQLI, directory traversal, forceful browsing, logic 
flaw and reflected XSS behind Flash). 
The web server hosting WackoPicko and used in our 
experiments was run on the OWASP Broken Web 
Applications Project virtual machine [8], which has numerous 
intentionally vulnerable applications (we ignore other 
applications). The following technologies are used: Apache 
2.2.14 on Linux Ubuntu 10.04.1, PHP/5.3.2-1ubuntu4.5 with 
Suhosin-Patch, and MySQL 5.0.67. The IP address of the 
victim server is 192.168.60.160. 
B. Conducted attacks 
We conducted three types of attacks on the WackoPicko, 
including: 
 SQL Injection on the login form; 
 Stored XSS on guestbook page; and 
 Remote file inclusion with null byte injection. 
SQL Injection on the login form is done by injecting a 
known string 1’or 1=1#, which allow us to login without a 
password as Sample User.  
On the guestbook page visitors can leave comments to 
every picture. These comment fields are not properly escaped, 
so we can use them for stored XSS attack. We insert the 
following script <script>location=" http://www.ugd.edu.mk/ 
index.php/mk;"</script> in the comment on the picture 
ugd.jpg (we uploaded this picture previously, and it is saved as 
4 images on the server: ugd.jpg, ugd.128.jpg, ugd.128_128.jpg 
and ugd.550.jpg). Whenever user visits the guestbook page and 
try to see the targeted picture in full size, the attack is triggered 
and the JavaScript code will be executed, redirecting the visitor 
to the link www.ugd.edu.mk. 
From WackoPicko, the admin page is vulnerable to file 
inclusion. We use remote file inclusion in two ways. In the first 
way, using the browser, we upload two public accessible shells 
b374k-shell.php [9] and c99shell.php [10] and one picture 
ugd.jpg, using the form for uploading pictures (through 
uploading, name of the scripts is changed to b374 and c99). We 
can run the shells using admin page and null byte injection, for 
example http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/admin/index.php? 
page=http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/upload/b374/b374%
00.php. Using this shell, we have removed the folder Cart (rm 
-rf cart) and we have created new folder Natasa (mkdir 
Natasa). Using the shell c99.php, we have changed the page 
http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/test.php, by adding a new 
link to the page http://www.w3schools.com. We chose two 
different shells, because b374k-shell.php sends commands to 
the server as part of the POST request body, and c99shell.php 
sends commands as parameters in the URL. 
The other way uses the known hacker tool Metasploit, 
(from Backtrack 5 R3) and its Reverse TCP Payload command, 
for generating the reverse shell payload /root/payload.php on 
the attacker’s machine. The procedure for uploading and using 
this shell on the victim machine is the same as previous (saved 
with name pay). Using this shell, we have deleted the file 
error.php (rm error.php) and uploaded the file hack.html 
(upload /root/hack.html). 
Usually, attackers use IP spoofing, but in this case we are 
not doing that, because we want to see the artifacts left on the 
attacker’s machine, by performing some web attacks. 
III. FORENSIC ANALYSIS 
In forensics expertise there are three main phases: 
acquisition, analysis, presentation.   
In the acquisition phase, the state of digital system, with all 
allocated and unallocated areas, is saved for later analysis. This 
copy is called an image. For preserving integrity of the image, 
the hash result of the image is calculated and saved. For 
making the image we used the free AccessData FTK Imager 
3.1 [11].  
The analysis phase takes the acquired data and involves 
examination of every piece of data from the evidence. We are 
starting with hypothesis for what kind of attack can be found. 
This phase includes search with keywords (names of files or 
folder that we assume that are produced from the attack). For 
analysis we are using two forensic tools - Autopsy (The Sleuth 
Kit, freeware) [12], and WinHex (freeware) [13]. 
In the last presentation phase, conclusions are made from 
the analysis and it is necessary to prepare a documentation that 
can be in a readable format for people who work in courts. This 
document is called forensic report. Clearly, the final part with 
forensic report is not done in this research. 
A. Analysis of the victim server 
The analysis of the victim image is done with the following 
forensic techniques: 
 File system analysis 
 Recovering of deleted files and folders 
 Log file analysis 
 Keyword search 
 Overview and keyword search of the swap area 
In terms of the file system analysis and recovering of 
deleted data, we can find that several new php scripts are 
present in the system, and that some files are recently changed. 
We can use their names in keyword search. We have examined 
the log files: error.log, access.log, mysql.log, and their versions 
with different extensions, for example, log.1, or log.1.gz. 
Again, we assume that we are dealing with careless attacker 
that did not change the log files. From the log files analysis, we 
can first determine that the attack on this server is performed 
from the IP address 192.168.60.159 and it runs on 32 bit 
version of Linux operating system with Mozilla Firefox 21.0 
web browser. Additionally, we obtained traces that show the 
use of b374 and c99 shells, and even the modification of the 
file test.php with c99 shell (see Table I) from 192.168.60.159. 
In mysql.log file one can find the following two traces 
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140904 14:59:32 565 Query SELECT * from `users` where 
`login` like '-1'or 1=1#' and `password` = SHA1( CONCAT('', 
`salt`)) limit 1  
605 Query INSERT INTO `comments` (`id`, `text`, `user_id`, 
`picture_id`, `created_on`) VALUES (NULL,'<script> 
location=\"http://www.ugd.edu.mk/index.php.mk;\"</script>', 
'12', '17', '2014-09-03 06:35:16') 
The first one, show us how the attacker’s SQL query is 
processed and the second tells us the creation date and time for 
stored XSS attack, and user_id of the user which created it. 
From the log files found in the location presented before, a 
keyword list can be prepared. In our research, the keyword list 
is consisted of the following terms: %00.php, natasa, b374, 
hack.html, c99, www.ugd.edu.mk, hack.php, test.php, Sample 
User, pay, ugd.550.jpg, error.php, Cart, and 
href="http://www.w3schools.com/". 
The useful results from the keyword search with WinHex 
were the same as those found in log files.  
An enormous interest was expected to be the swap file 
(which had 400MB of size) and inside that file were not found 
any hits, which could be further treated as clues/traces for the 
interest in the analysis. Or in other words, the SWAP area has 
proven as a useless target for the task.  
B. Analysis of the attacker’s machine 
The analysis of the suspect’s image is done with the 
following forensic techniques using Autopsy: 
TABLE I.  PART OF A KEYWORD SEARCH ON THE VICTIM MACHINE WITH COMMENTS, PRESENTED ALSO AS ENTRIES IN ACCESS.LOG  
No. Search hints Name Path Modified Accessed 
Inode 
Modificatio
n 
Comment 
1 
[192.168.60.159 - - [03/Sep/2014:07:19:26 -
0400] "GET 
/WackoPicko/admin/index.php?page=http://1
92.168.60.160/WackoPicko/upload/b374/b37
4%00.php HTTP/1.1" 200 1773 "-" 
"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686 on x86_64; 
rv:14.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/14.0.1" 
 
access.log \var\log\apache2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
03/09/2014 
12:35:24 +2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
Successful use of 
the script 
b374.php with 
null byte 
injection and 
GET request 
from IP address 
192.168.60.159  
2 
192.168.60.159 - - [03/Sep/2014:07:19:46 -
0400] "POST 
/WackoPicko/admin/index.php?page=http://1
92.168.60.160/WackoPicko/upload/b374/b37
4%00.php& HTTP/1.1" 200 1792 
"http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/admin/i
ndex.php?page=http://192.168.60.160/Wack
oPicko/upload/b374/b374%00.php" 
"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686 on x86_64; 
rv:14.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/14.0.1" 
access.log \var\log\apache2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
03/09/2014 
12:35:24 +2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
Successful use of 
the script 
b374.php with 
null byte 
injection and 
POST request 
from IP address 
192.168.60.159  
3 
192.168.60.159 - - [03/Sep/2014:08:40:45 -
0400] "POST 
/WackoPicko/admin/index.php?page=http%3
A%2F%2F192.168.60.160%2FWackoPicko
%2Fupload%2Fc99%2Fc99%00.php&act=f
&f=test.php&ft=edit&d=%2Fowaspbwa%2F
WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git%2Fwebsite%2F HTTP/1.1" 200 3595 
"http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/admin/i
ndex.php?page=http%3A%2F%2F192.168.6
0.160%2FWackoPicko%2Fupload%2Fc99%
2Fc99%00.php&act=f&f=test.php&ft=edit&
d=%2Fowaspbwa%2FWackoPicko-
relative_urls-git%2Fwebsite%2F" 
"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686 on x86_64; 
rv:14.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/14.0.1" 
access.log \var\log\apache2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
03/09/2014 
12:35:24 +2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
Successful use of 
the script 
c99.php with 
null byte 
injection and 
POST request 
from IP address 
192.168.60.159. 
From the URL, 
one can see that 
file test.php is 
edited (ft=edit). 
4 
192.168.60.159 - - [03/Sep/2014:10:01:12 -
0400] "GET 
/WackoPicko/admin/index.php?page=http://1
92.168.60.160/WackoPicko/upload/pay/pay
%00 HTTP/1.1" 200 26 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 
(X11; Linux i686 on x86_64; rv:14.0) 
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/14.0.1" 
access.log \var\log\apache2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
03/09/2014 
12:35:24 +2 
03/09/2014 
16:22:35 +2 
Successful use of 
the script pay 
with null byte 
injection and 
GET request 
from IP address 
192.168.60.159 
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 TABLE II.  SOME RESULTS OF THE FILE SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND HASH COMPARING USING FTK IMAGER AND AUTOPSY 
Victim machine file system Attacker machine file system 
Location MD5 Hash Location MD5 Hash 
\[root]\owaspbwa\WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git\website\hack.html 
c12d9b7961e6dccf2
46eecfd50b4d165 
root/hack.html  
 
c12d9b7961e6dccf2
46eecfd50b4d165  
 
\[root]\owaspbwa\WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git\website\upload\c99\c99 
83f83bb415b98d41f
bcae9193b47c984 
root/Desktop/c99shell.php  
 
83f83bb415b98d41f
bcae9193b47c984  
 
\[root]\owaspbwa\WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git\website\upload\pay\pay 
946d436048ca2e3c2
f271c2b035a7774 
root/payload.php  
 
946d436048ca2e3c2
f271c2b035a7774  
 
\[root]\owaspbwa\WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git\website\upload\ugd\ugd 
d5105a4fd856aa1eee
786bc10fd35898 
root/Desktop/ugd.jpeg  
 
d5105a4fd856aa1ee
e786bc10fd35898  
 
\[root]\owaspbwa\WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git\website\upload\ugd\ugd.550.jpg 
8b2ca7498c6f2dc14
0695e9031211fca 
root/.mozilla/firefox/nq474mcm.default/
Cache/8/9E/769E1d01  
 
8b2ca7498c6f2dc14
0695e9031211fca  
 
\[root]\owaspbwa\WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git\website\upload\ugd\ugd.128.jpg 
bfcb3fc8420481c5be
8fd9609291ef56 
root/.mozilla/firefox/nq474mcm.default/
Cache/5/10/43DABd0  
 
bfcb3fc8420481c5b
e8fd9609291ef56  
 
\[root]\owaspbwa\WackoPicko-relative_urls-
git\website\upload\b374\b374 
cc8d0f69743578361
0a4c17278e3c51c 
root/.mozilla/firefox/nq474mcm.default/
Cache/1/64/268A0d01  
 
cc8d0f69743578361
0a4c17278e3c51c  
 
 
TABLE III.  SOME RESULTS FROM LOG ANALYSIS AND INTERNET HISTORY FILES FROM ATTACKER’S MACHINE WITH AUTOPSY 
Content  
Program 
Source File 
Date 
Accessed 
Tags 
Comment 
http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/admi
n/index.php?page=http://192.168.60.160/
WackoPicko/upload/b374/b374%00.php 
FireFox root/.mozilla/firefox/nq474
mcm.default/places.sqlite 
2014/09/03 
07:19:20 
Mozilla 
History 
Using of the script 
b374.php on IP address 
192.168.60.160. 
http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/admi
n/index.php?page=http%3A%2F%2F192
.168.60.160%2FWackoPicko%2Fupload
%2Fc99%2Fc99%00.php&act=f&f=test.
php&ft=edit&d=%2Fowaspbwa%2FWac
koPicko-relative_urls-
git%2Fwebsite%2F  
FireFox 
root/.mozilla/firefox/nq474
mcm.default/places.sqlite 
 
2014/09/03 
08:40:40 
 
Mozilla 
History 
Using of the script c99.php 
with null byte injection on 
IP address 192.168.60.160. 
From the URL, one can see 
that file test.php is edited 
(ft=edit). 
Name> b374_included 
URL> 192.168.60.160 
FireFox 
root/.mozilla/firefox/nq474
mcm.default/cookies.sqlite 
  
This is a sample artifact 
found at the browser’s 
cache folder which 
represents a cookie from 
the attacked site with 
already applied the 
intrusion script b374 
 
 
 File system analysis and hash comparing  
 Log file analysis and internet history files 
 OS and third party software artifacts/CLI history 
overview 
 Keyword search 
 Preparation of forensic report  
According to the report of the incident and the previous 
analysis on the server, the forensic expert can have a starting 
point for answering the question - Is the suspect the attacker 
itself? We actually have the attacker’s machine, and the 
following results are found: 
File system analysis and hash comparing  
In this case, a complete file search activity is done in which 
every file and folder is hashed. From the attacked side, the 
forensic expert can find names and hash values of the files 
which one thinks that are produced from the incident, and see if 
some of those values can be found in the suspect’s image. If so, 
there is a starting point for determining that this is the actual 
attacker. In this case, we have found that the file content and 
their hash values are appropriate for both sides, so we have a 
starting point. From Table II, one can see that the shells used in 
the attack, are the same files on both machines, and also 
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uploaded files ugd.jpg and hack.html are the same.  
Additionally, one can see that created versions of the picture 
ugd.jpg on the victim machine can be found in the cache of the 
web browser Mozilla Firefox on attacker machine. This type of 
forensic analysis is proven to be very useful.   
We can conclude that careless attacker that saves and use 
shells for an attack, lives evidences for their existence on both 
machines. 
Log file analysis and internet history files 
The mentioned activity in general is focused on locating 
internet artifacts which can be found in web browser temporary 
storage and browser’s history files. In this case, several URL 
records and cached content is found, which proves that the user 
was visiting the attacked site. Since our attacking methods are 
conducted through the interface of the web browser, this 
analysis can prove the act of the third attack, the methodology 
(used scripts) and the files that were the object of the intrusion. 
Sample results are given in Table III. 
Because web browser is the primary way of performing 
selected attacks, it is normal that we have found evidence in 
Internet history, again, if the attacker is careless. 
OS and third party software artifacts 
A useful forensic artifacts are found in the bash history file 
(Table IV). Apparently the forensic expert can conclude that 
the user has cleaned the other history of the shell activity, or 
the shell was not used for other attacks. Also, additional 
interesting forensic artifact can be the IP address of the 
suspect’s machine, but in this case, the operating system of the 
suspect machine was using an automatic assigned IP address 
from the virtual machine. Therefore, the file at the location 
etc/network/interfaces in this case does not prove anything. 
If the attacker had used the command prompt for carrying 
the attack, the bash_history file keeps the records of executed 
commands (if it is not erased by the attacker). So, for example, 
if the attacker uses the Metasploit console, every command will 
be recorded in the bash_history file. 
TABLE IV.  INTERESTED RESULT FROM OS ARTIFACT ANALYSIS 
File name Location Content 
.bash_history 
root/ 
bash_history 
msfpayload php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp 
LHOST=192.168.60.159 LPORT=4444 R 
>/root/payload.php 
  
Keyword search 
From the keyword search approach we can obtain 
additional information, some of them are presented in Table V 
(for keyword hack.html).  
IV. DISCUSSIONS 
From the obtained results, we can summarized several 
results. First, remote file inclusion and use of shells leave many 
traces on the attacker’s and the victim’s machine. If the shell 
carries out commands through a POST request, its successful 
use is documented (without content of POST body) in victim 
log files and in the attacker files places.sqlite and possible in 
the cookies.sqlite. Even more, if the shell carries out 
commands as parameters in the URL, they are documented in 
the same way, and even the attack can be reconstructed 
correctly. If the attacker use Metasploit console, he leaves 
traces in a batch_history file on its machine. 
TABLE V.  SOME RESULTS FROM KEYWORD SEARCH ANALYSIS ON 
ATTACKER’S MACHINE 
File location Preview 
/img_image.E01/opt/me
tasploit/postgresql/data/
pg_xlog/000000010000
000000000002 
/root/«hack.html« -> /root/«hack.html« 
session_uploady 
/img_image.E01/root/.m
ozilla/firefox/nq474mc
m.default/places.sqlite 
160/WackoPicko/«hack.html« 
http://192.168.60.160/WackoPicko/u 
/img_image.E01/root/.m
ozilla/firefox/nq474mc
m.default/sessionstore-
1.js 
160/WackoPicko/«hack.html«","ID":20,"d
ocshellID":8,"docIdentifier":20 
/img_image.E01/opt/me
tasploit/postgresql/data/
pg_xlog/xlogtemp.3440 
/root/«hack.html« -> /root/«hack.html« 
session_uploady 
 
Examples of our SQL injection and stored XSS attacks use 
the body of the POST request, so they do not leave any traces 
in the victim log files nor the browser history files. The script 
from the stored XSS attack is saved in the backend database 
and it leaves traces in the mysql.log file, which includes a time 
stamp and user_id which identifies the user who create this 
entry. Also SQL injection login leaves traces in the mysql.log 
file. It is difficult to connect the traces from mysql.log file with 
the attacker machine. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Using post-mortem computer forensic analysis of attacker 
and victim machine, we found several artifacts on them, for 
scenario of three types of attacks: SQL Injection, stored XSS, 
and remote file inclusion with a null byte injection. Careless 
attacker that saves and use shells for his attack, leaves evidence 
on both machines. On the attacker’s machine, traces were 
found in the browser’s history files, browser’ temporary 
storage, and bash_history_file. On the victim’s machine, traces 
were found in the file system and in the log files. These 
artifacts can help to identify and sometimes to reconstruct 
performed attacks, and even more, they can represent a valid 
evidence for the court. 
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